George K. Thompson and Frank S. Markhap, Thompson-Markham Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, William M. Knerr, O. F. McShane, Frank A. Jugler, E. A. Hodges : Reply Brief of Plaintiffs by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
George K. Thompson and Frank S. Markhap,
Thompson-Markham Company v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, William M. Knerr, O. F.
McShane, Frank A. Jugler, E. A. Hodges : Reply
Brief of Plaintiffs
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Geo. W. Worthen; Attorney for Plaintiffs;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Thompson-Markham Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 6221 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/614
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
GEORGE K. THOMPSON and FRtANK S. 
MARKHAM, co-partnership doing busi-
ness under the firm name and style of 
THOMPSON-MARKHAM COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, WILLIAM M. KNERR, Chairman 
and member of said The Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and 
FRANK A. JUGLER1 members of said 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, and 
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine In-
spector, 
Defendants. 
No. 6221 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
GEO. W. WORTHEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Received copy of within Brief this __________________________________________ day of 
April, 1940. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
GEORGE K. THOMPSON and FRANK S. 
MARKHAM, co-partnership doing busi-
ness under the firm name and style of 
THOMPSON-MARKHAM COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, WILLIAM M. KNERR, Chairman 
and member of said The Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and 
FRANK A. JUGLER, members of said 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, and 
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine In-
spector, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
No. 6221 
At Page 6 of defendants' brief counsel observed that: 
"Numerous tunnels have been driven in the moun-
tains for purposes other than mining, and yet the ques-
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tion is raised in this Court for the first time. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the persons who made these 
tunnels felt that they were amenable to the eight hour 
law and complied with the same, otherwise it would 
seem that the matter, long ago, would have been 
brought before the Courts." 
We submit that no such presumption can be indulged. 
But, assuming, without admitting, that others have com-
plied with this eight hour law, their conduct can have no 
binding effect upon these plaintiffs or upon this Court. 
Counsel next observe that Section 103-1-2 Revised 
Statutes of Utah, abolishes the common rule of strict con-
struction with respect to penal statutes. We recognize that 
the Court is concerned only with ascertaining the Legisla-
tive intent. But we do submit that penal statutes as stated 
in plaintiffs' brief will be interpreted as applying only to 
such classes of employment as come clearly within the 
terms of the Act. 
In Volumes 59 C. J. Section 661, Page 1119-21 the au-
thor uses this language: 
"In some jurisdictions, the rule of strict construc-
tion of penal statutes has been abolished by statute, 
and in these jurisdictions, they may be liberally con-
strued, according to the fair import of their terms with 
a view to effect their object and promote justice . . . 
Nevertheless, the courts in these jurisdictions will not 
enlarge penal statutes by implication or intendment be-
yond the fair meaning of the language used, nor will 
they be held to include other offenses and persons than 
those which are clearly described and provided, for . . . 
In order to enforce a penalty against a person, he must 
be brought clearly within both the spirit and the let-
ter of the statute; and if there is a fair doubt as to 
whether the act charged is embraced in the prohibition, 
that doubt will be resolved in favor of accused ... " 
We believe there is no reasonable basis upon which to 
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include plaintiffs within the prohibition of the statute in 
question. Our further position is, that if there is a question 
as to the statute extending to plaintiffs, any doubt on that 
point must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. 
An examination of Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Sec-
tion 7892, discloses that our Section 103-1-2 Revised Stat-
utes of Utah, 1933 was adopted from California Penal Code 
Section 4 which reads as follows: 
"The rule of the common law that penal statutes 
are to be strictly construed has no application to this 
code. All its provisions are to be construed according 
to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect 
their objects and promote justice." 
However, in the case of Ex parte Twing, cited in plain-
tiffs' brief at Page 13, the California Court held that penal 
statutes must be construed to reach no further than their 
words, and that no person can be made subject to them by 
implication. 
The California Court in the case of Miller v. Salomon, 
281 Pac. 89 cited on Page 1119 of Volume 59 C. J. held that 
in determining the application of a penal statute it will be 
given a strict construction. In that case the Court, at Page 
89 of the Pacific Report said: 
"The statute being a penal statute when under con-
sideration as here, will receive a strict construction." 
Our view is that the rule of liberal construction as to 
penal statutes does not extend to the point of denying to 
one charged with the commission of a crime, the benefit of 
a doubt as to whether or not he comes within the class 
intended to be charged. 
Penal Laws of New York, Section 21 abolished the 
common law rule of strict construction and provided that 
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penal statutes must be construed according to the fair im-
port of their terms to promote justice and effect the ob-
ject of the law. 
In Wallace v. Walsh (N. Y.) 25 N. E. 1076, 11 L. R. A. 
166, the Court said at Page 169 of the L. R. A. Report: 
"The Courts have uniformly refused to extend a 
penal act beyond the strict letter of the Statute in order 
to bring a case within its meaning which was not clear-
ly embraced in its letter." 
In the case of City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas and 
Electric Corporation, (N. Y.) 134 N. E. 828, it was held 
that 
"Strained and forced construction is not permissi-
ble to extend to doubtful situations the prohibition of 
a penal statute." 
In the case of People v. Hemleb, 111 N.Y. Supplement 
690, it was held that the rule requiring words of a statute 
to be construed in connection with the other words thereof 
is "Especially applicable in the construction of criminal 
statutes, for such statutes can not be strained in construc-
tion to make out a crime." 
The statutes of Oklahoma provide for the same rule 
of construction as our statute. 
It was provided in Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, 1909, 
Section 2027, as follows: 
"The rule· of common law that penal statutes are 
to be strictly construed has no application to this code. 
All its provisions are to be construed according to the 
fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its ob-
ject and to promote justice." 
In McDonald v. State, (Okla.) 15 Pac. 2nd 149, the 
Court, at Page 150, said: 
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"It is a fundamental princple of criminal law that 
there can be no constructive offenses, and statutes are 
not to be enlarged by construction or extended by in-
ference to cover acts not clearly within both the letter 
and the spirit of a penal statute." 
In State v. Barnett, (Okla.) 69 Pac. 2nd 77, the Court 
said: 
"It is a well settled rule that a penal statute must 
be construed with such strictness as to carefully guard 
the rights of the accused and at the same time preserve 
the obvious intention of the Legislature ... " 
The Oklahoma Court in the last mentioned case quoted 
approvingly from Connally \'. General Construction Com-
pany, 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126 as follows: 
"A statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessar.Hy guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application violates the first essential of 
due process of law." 
In the Connally case, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, at Page 128 of the 46th S. Ct. Report, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Sutherland said: 
"The dividing line between what is lawful and un-
lawful can not be left to conjecture. The citizen can 
not be held to answer charges based upon penal stat-
utes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will 
reasonably admit of different constructions." 
We submit that the statute in question, even if this 
Court had never interpreted the words "underground mines 
or workings" and if the Legislature had not re-enacted the 
identical words in later statutes and revisions, would be 
sufficiently uncertain to reasonably admit of different con-
structions; but in the light of the judicial interpretation and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the Legislative acquiescence therein, we submit that the 
term "underground mines or workings" restricts the lan-
guage to underground workings connected with mining. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEO. W. WORTHEN 
I I 
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